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Abstract
While the effect of social security systems on retirement decisions
has received much attention, the impact of these systems on
individuals’ incentives to invest in their human capital has not been
analyzed. We integrate human capital investment and retirement
decisions in a simple analytical life-cycle model with full certainty and
investigate how different social security schemes may a¤ect welfare,
human capital investment and labor supply. We analyze and
compare three different social security systems. Our results suggest
that actuarial adjustment and the link between individual social
security contributions and benefits increase human capital
investment and postpone retirement.
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The decrease in old age labor force participation rates is one of the most signi…cant labor
market trends in European countries and the United States over the last four decades; in
some countries, the labor force participation rate for men aged 60 to 64 has fallen by up to
75%. Since life expectancy has increased at the same time, explaining this secular trend by
worse health conditions is implausible. A more convincing reason suggested by Boskin (1977)
is the development in social security systems. This explanation is supported by Gruber and
Wise (1999), who …nd a strong correspondence in Western countries between early retirement
and social security provisions. In particular, early retirement is widespread in countries with
high implicit tax penalties on wage earnings after social security eligibility.
While the e¤ect of social security systems on retirement decisions has received much
attention, the impact of these systems on individual incentives to invest in human capital
has not been analyzed. We integrate human capital investment and retirement decisions in a
simple analytical life-cycle model and investigate how di¤erent social security schemes may
a¤ect welfare and the supply of labor services. Two important features of social security
systems are highlighted here: (i) actuarial adjustment, and (ii) the link between individual
social security contributions and bene…ts. We expect that actuarial adjustment encourages
later retirement because the present value of social security bene…ts is una¤ected by the
retirement age, and we expect that the link between social security contributions and bene…ts
has a positive e¤ect on human capital investment because the return on human capital
investment increases. Finally, the interaction between these two links is analyzed. How does
1actuarial adjustment a¤ect human capital, and how does the link between social security
contributions and bene…ts a¤ect retirement behavior?
There is a trade-o¤ between model complexity and robustness of results in dynamic life-
cycle models. For example, Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) apply a two-period overlapping
generations model with endogenous human capital formation to analyze e¢ciency e¤ects
of human capital taxation. Given a constant labor supply and a proportional tax rate on
capital income, they …nd that a progressive tax rate on labor income may be defended on
pure e¢ciency grounds – the reduced private return on human capital investment o¤sets the
discrimination in favor of human capital investment if labor and capital income are taxed by
the same proportional tax rate. Even in this simple model, Nielsen and Sørensen do not get
unambiguous positive or negative results of the desirability of dual income taxation when
the supply of labor is endogenous. We assume that lifetime utility is separable in lifetime
consumption and leisure. The interest rate is normalized at zero, and we do not take stance
on the allocation of consumption over the life-cycle. This speci…cation allows us to classify
di¤erent social security bene…t systems according to human capital investment, retirement
and welfare.
Pogue and Sgontz (1977) show that social security systems may a¤ect public invest-
ment in human capital through intergenerational transfers. They argue that the unfunded
“pay-as-you-go” social security system provides a stronger incentive for current working age
generations to invest in the human capital of younger generations compared to a fully funded
social security system. The pay-as-you-go social security system may therefore improve wel-
2fare for all generations if the rate of return on human capital investment exceeds the rate
of return on …nancial investment in the fully funded system. We include the pay-as-you-go
system with a balanced budget. However, the interest rate is equal to zero and there is no
population growth, which implies that there is no distinction between this unfunded system
and a funded system.
We analyze and compare the e¤ects of three di¤erent social security components on
private retirement and education decisions. Social security bene…ts are …nanced by a pro-
portional tax rate on labor income in each system, and the three components include: (i)
constant “old age bene…ts” paid to individuals who are older than a given entitlement age,
(ii) “uniform retirement bene…ts” paid to retired individuals, and (iii) “income dependent
bene…ts” paid to retired individuals as a proportion of wage income during a given period
before retirement. The …rst component is actuarially fair, since the present value of social se-
curity bene…ts is independent of the retirement age. The last two components do not include
any actuarial adjustment. The third component introduces a link between social security
contributions and bene…ts, whereas social security bene…ts do not depend on contributions
in the …rst two components.
Investment in human capital is viewed here as a private investment decision by individ-
uals. The duration of education is kept constant, but the level of human capital depends
on resources devoted by the individual to education. This representation of human capital
investment allows us to capture the tax distortion attributable to non-deductible tuition fees,
which is relevant in the United States. Education systems in Europe, on the other hand, are
3mainly …nanced by the public sector, and the opportunity cost of human capital investment
thus mainly consists of lost after-tax wage income. Given the level of human capital, the
agent then decides how long he or she will be active in the labor market and when to retire.
A high level of human capital encourages individuals to retire later because the opportunity
cost of retirement is high.
During retirement the agent receives social security bene…ts according to the social se-
curity system. The results suggest that actuarial social security schemes encourage later
retirement and thus increase the incentive to invest in human capital compared to non-
actuarial schemes. We also …nd that a stronger correspondence between earnings history
and social security bene…ts increases the incentive to invest in human capital and postpones
retirement.
2 Human Capital and Retirement without Social Se-
curity
To illustrate how di¤erent social security systems may a¤ect the supply and quality of
labor, we construct a simple life-cycle model with endogenous human capital formation and
retirement. After completing education, the agent decides how long he/she will be active in
the labor market and when to retire. In other words, the retirement age is endogenous in
the model. All agents are identical, and we analyze the optimal behavior of a representative
agent.
4Human capital investment includes education obtained at universities and other institu-
tions of higher learning, as well as any courses and other training obtained elsewhere. Some
inputs have to be purchased, like tuition and books. While agents clearly decide on both
time devoted to human capital investment and inputs purchased, we restrict our attention to
inputs purchased and keep the time devoted to human capital investment constant. Includ-
ing both time and expenditures as decision variables would require assumptions concerning
how these two types of resource combine in producing human capital, a topic which is beyond
the scope of our analysis.
The time horizon for each agent is normalized at unity, and there is no uncertainty
about life expectancy or return on education. Since the duration of education is constant,
we analyze only the allocation of time between work and retirement. Perfect competition
prevails in each market, which implies that output and factor prices are given to all agents
in the model. The interest rate is normalized at zero, and there is no market for physical
capital. The homogeneous consumption good can be borrowed or lent internationally at a
zero interest rate, so we need not restrict the distribution of consumption over time. We
assume that lifetime utility e U is separable in lifetime consumption and retirement:
e U = U(C)+V (R); (1)
where U is a concave function of consumption C,a n dV is a concave function of the duration
of retirement R.T h e w a g e r a t e , w, is a concave function of human capital investment H,
5w = w(H).W ea s s u m et h a t lim
C!0+ U0(C)=1, lim
R!0+ V 0(R)=1,a n d lim
H!0+ w0(H)=1 in
order to guarantee interior solutions.
The lifetime budget constraint states that the value of lifetime expenditures on consump-
tion and human capital investment cannot exceed lifetime income from the supply of labor
services:
(1 ¡ R) ¢ w(H)=C + H; (2)
where (1 ¡ R) is the duration of working life, as well as the point in time at which the
individual retires from the labor market.
The representative agent maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to the human capital
production function and the lifetime budget constraint (2). The …rst-order condition with
respect to human capital is:
(1 ¡ R) ¢ w
0(H)=1 ;
where the left-hand side is the return on human capital investment, and the right-hand side
is the opportunity cost in terms of foregone consumption. The …rst-order condition with




6where the left-hand side is the marginal utility of retirement, and the marginal cost on the
right-hand side is equal to foregone labor income times the marginal utility of consumption
goods. These two equations determine optimal choices of human capital investment and the
d u r a t i o no fr e t i r e m e n t .
3 Human Capital Investment and Retirement with So-
cial Security
We use the life-cycle model to analyze steady state e¤ects of a social security system with
three di¤erent components. Social security bene…ts are …nanced by a proportional tax rate
on labor income, and the three components include (i) constant “old age bene…ts” paid to
individuals who are older than a given entitlement age, (ii) “uniform retirement bene…ts”
paid to retired individuals, and (iii) “income dependent bene…ts” paid to retired individuals
as a proportion of wage income during a given period before retirement. The …rst component
is actuarially fair, since the present value of social security bene…ts is independent of the
retirement age. The last two components do not include any actuarial adjustment, and both
systems e¤ectively subsidize retirement since they drive the private cost of retirement below
the net wage. The third component introduces a link between social security contributions
and bene…ts, whereas social security bene…ts do not depend on past contributions in the …rst
two components. Prices and quantities are constant in steady state because the interest rate
and the growth rate are normalized at zero. Variables do therefore not carry time indices.
73.1 Introducing Di¤erent Bene…t Schemes
In the …rst social security system, each person is entitled to “old age bene…ts” at age b R.
T h eo l da g eb e n e … t sa r ec o n s t a n ta n de q u a lt oz per unit of time, which implies that each
individual receives a lump sum lifetime social security payment of B = b Rz from the govern-
ment. The social security payments are …nanced by a proportional tax rate on labor income,
t1, and the public budget constraint with respect to this component is:
t1(1 ¡ R) ¢ w(H)=b Rz = B: (3)
The left-hand side is equal to tax payments from current generations who work, and the
right-hand side re‡ects social security payments to current old generations.
The second social security system includes a uniform bene…t ‡ow, say a given monthly
bene…t to retired persons. The “uniform retirement bene…ts” are denoted by b,a n dt h e
payments are …nanced by a proportional tax rate on labor income, t2.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
public budget constraint is:
t2(1 ¡ R) ¢ w(H)=Rb:
Again, the left-hand side is equal to tax payments from current generations who work, and
the right-hand side is equal to social security payments to current old generations.
Finally, we introduce a social security system in which bene…ts depend on wage income
8during a given period before retirement. In particular, social security bene…ts are determined
as a proportion, p, of wage income during a period, n, before retirement.1 De…ning x ´ np,
social security bene…ts for individual i are determined by:
bi = x ¢ w(Hi);
where x is an exogenous fraction of wage rate. The “income dependent bene…ts” are …nanced
by a proportional tax rate, t3, on labor income, and the public budget constraint is given
by:
t3(1 ¡ R) ¢ w(H)=Rx ¢ w(H);
where the left-hand side is equal to tax payments from individuals who work. All individuals
are identical in the model, and the right-hand side is equal to aggregate social security
payments to retired generations.
Combining the three social security systems, the budget constraint for the representative
agent is:
(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ R) ¢ w(H)+B + Rb + Rx ¢ w(H)=C + H: (4)
All the three systems that we analyze introduce some form of distortion in the economic
1Since the wage rate is constant in the model, the length of the period is not important for the results,
unless the period is su¢ciently long to postpone retirement.
9decision making. A system with perfect correspondence between an individual’s own so-
cial security tax payments and bene…ts received would in our framework only replicate the
solution without social security.
3.2 Incentive E¤ects of Social Security
The representative agent maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to the lifetime budget con-
straint (4). The …rst-order condition with respect to human capital investment is:
[(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ R) ¢ w
0 + Rx ¢ w
0 ¡ 1]U
0 =0 ;
and the …rst-order condition with respect to retirement is:
[¡(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3) ¢ w + b + x ¢ w]U
0 + V
0 =0 :
The …rst-order condition with respect to human capital investment simpli…es to:
(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ R) ¢ w
0 + Rx ¢ w
0 =1 ;
where the left-hand side is the return on human capital investment and the right-hand side
is the opportunity cost in terms of foregone consumption. The second term on the left-
hand side measures the return on human capital investment through its e¤ects on social
security bene…ts. Social security taxes decrease the return on human capital investment,
10whereas income dependent retirement bene…ts partially o¤set this decrease.2 The …rst-order
condition with respect to retirement can be written as:
V
0 =[ ( 1¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3) ¢ w ¡ b ¡ x ¢ w]U
0;
where the left-hand side is the marginal utility of retirement, and the marginal cost on the
right-hand side is equal to the net income loss due to retirement times the marginal utility
of consumption goods. Note that social security taxes, “uniform retirement bene…ts” and
“income dependent bene…ts” decrease the marginal cost of retirement.
Using Cramer’s rule, we analyze and compare the three di¤erent social security compo-
nents with respect to private retirement and education decisions. The results are derived in
Appendix A and can be summarized as:
Proposition 1 An increase in the tax rate to …nance any component of the social security
system discourages human capital investment and encourages early retirement.
Proposition 2 Increasing the share of “uniform retirement bene…ts” at the expense of ei-
ther constant “old age bene…ts” or “income dependent bene…ts” discourages human capital
investment and encourages early retirement.
The social security system a¤ects human capital investment in two ways. First, it may
change the return on human capital investment at any given retirement age. The system in
2It is useful to contrast our results with Heckman (1976). Heckman assumes that the demand for leisure
is constant and the opportunity cost of human capital investment is equal to foregone labor income. With
those assumptions, labor income taxes are non-distortionary.
11which social security bene…ts depend on wage income before retirement encourages human
capital investment compared to systems without the link. Second, the social security system
may indirectly a¤ect human capital investment through the impact on retirement age, which
a¤ects the amortization period of human capital investment. We …nd that actuarial adjust-
ment has a positive e¤ect on human capital investment, because it postpones retirement.
Hence, replacing “income dependent bene…ts” or constant “old age bene…ts” with “uniform
retirement bene…ts” discourages human capital investment.
Retirement decisions are also a¤ected in two ways by the social security system. First,
social security bene…ts lower the private opportunity cost of retirement. The private op-
portunity cost of retirement is reduced by the retirement bene…t in the two non-actuarial
social security systems compared to the actuarial system. Replacing “old age bene…ts” with
“uniform retirement bene…ts” thus encourages early retirement. Second, the social security
system indirectly a¤ects the retirement age through human capital investment, since the level
of human capital a¤ects individual productivity. Increasing the share of “uniform retirement
bene…ts” compared to “income dependent bene…ts” therefore encourages early retirement.
It is not possible to say anything decisive about education and retirement decisions across
the “old age bene…t” and “income dependent bene…t” components. We relegate this issue
to the next section, where we restrict the lifetime utility function to be of the Cobb-Douglas
variety.
124 Special Case: Cobb-Douglas Utility Speci…cation
4.1 Incentive E¤ects of Social Security
We apply next a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation of the utility function and assume that each
agent maximizes:
e U =l n ( C)+¯ ln(R); (5)
where ¯>0 is the relative weight of utility from retirement. The individual stock of human
capital is determined by H®,w h e r e0 <®<1. The marginal productivity of human capital
investment is thus diminishing, which implies that human capital investment is strictly
positive and bounded. The representative individual maximizes lifetime utility, (5) subject
to the lifetime budget constraint:
(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ R) ¢ H
® + B + Rb + Rx ¢ H
® = C + H: (6)
The …rst term on the left-hand side is lifetime wage income after tax, the second term is the
sum of old age bene…ts, the third term is the sum of uniform retirement bene…ts, and the
fourth term is the sum of income dependent bene…ts. Solving the individual maximization
problem, we …nd that the …rst-order conditions with respect to human capital investment
13and retirement simplify to
H =
·
®(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2)





t2 + t3 + ¯(1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2))
1 ¡ t1 + ¯(1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2))
: (8)
These two equations allow us to compare incentive e¤ects across “old age bene…t” and
“income dependent bene…t” components. The results are derived in Appendix B, and they
show:
Proposition 3 Increasing the share of “income dependent bene…ts” at the expense of “old
age bene…ts” increases human capital investment and leads to earlier retirement.
This proposition suggests that the link between social security contributions and ben-
e…ts is more important than the actuarial link with respect to human capital investment,
whereas actuarial adjustment is more important with respect to retirement decisions. The
intuitive explanation is that …rst-order e¤ects (the e¤ect of linking bene…ts to wage level
on human capital investment and the e¤ect of actuarial adjustment on retirement age) are
more important than second-order e¤ects (the e¤ect of retirement decision on human capital
investment and the e¤ect of human capital investment on retirement decision).
Using a Cobb-Douglas representation of the lifetime utility function, the results of propo-
sitions 2 and 3 can be summarized as:
14Proposition 4 Measured by human capital investment, the descending order of the three
social security systems is: income dependent bene…ts, old age bene…ts and uniform retirement
bene…ts. Measured by the retirement age, the descending order is: old age bene…ts, income
dependent bene…ts and uniform retirement bene…ts.
The ranking of the three systems with respect to human capital investment and retirement
age are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In these examples, we set ® = ¯ =0 :5.
FIGURES 1 AND 2
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the di¤erences between human capital investment and
retirement age are magni…ed when the social security tax rate increases.
4.2 Welfare E¤ects of Social Security
Finally, we compare welfare across the three social security systems. Using the lifetime utility
function (5), we can calculate the level of utility with three social security systems of only
one component and without social security. Private consumption is equal to (1¡R)H®¡H,
since the value of social security bene…ts is equal to social security contributions in the steady
state equilibrium. The lifetime utility function thus simpli…es to:
U = ln((1 ¡ R)H
® ¡ H)+¯ ln(R): (9)
15The utility of any given social security system is subsequently derived by substituting the
expressions for H and R into the utility function (Appendix C provides a comparison of
utility across the three di¤erent social security systems). The results can be summarized as:
Proposition 5 Given the social security tax rate, uniform retirement bene…ts lead to lower
utility than old age bene…ts and income dependent bene…ts. Depending on parameter values,
old age bene…ts may lead to either lower or higher utility than income dependent bene…ts. In
any of these systems, the utility level is decreasing with respect to the tax rate.
This proposition suggests that welfare is improved by both actuarial adjustment and
by the link between earnings history and social security bene…ts. The relative importance
of these two links depends on parameter values. In Figure 3, ® = ¯ =0 :5, and “old age
bene…ts” lead to higher utility than “income dependent bene…ts” when tax rates are not
extremely high. In Figure 4, ® =0 :5 and ¯ =1 :5, and “income dependent bene…ts” lead to
higher utility than “old age bene…ts”. Furthermore, the crossing of utility curves associated
with “old age bene…ts” and “income dependent bene…ts” in Figure 3 illustrates that the
order of these systems may depend on the level of taxation.
FIGURES 3 AND 4
A caveat to be remembered in the interpretation of our welfare results is that they
capture only distortions associated with incentive e¤ects of social security, without including
16any potential bene…ts from these systems.3
5 Conclusions and Implications
We have analyzed the interaction between social security rules, human capital investment,
and the timing of retirement. Our results highlight two important links in social security
systems: (i) actuarial adjustment and (ii) the link between contributions made and bene…ts
received. We …nd that actuarially adjusted systems lead to later retirement than systems
with a weaker actuarial adjustment. This corresponds to the empirical …nding by Börsch-
Supan (2000), who suggests that retirement before age 60 would be reduced by more than
a third if the German social security system were reformed and made actuarially fair. We
also …nd that the link between bene…ts and contributions encourages human capital invest-
ment. The results stress the importance of incentives embedded in social security rules, since
distortions arise even when agents are identical and there is no redistribution in equilibrium.
The results highlight the e¢ciency and welfare gains that may be available through a
better planning of social security rules. However, our framework does not include uncertainty.
The public …nance literature identi…es several ways in which redistribution may improve
welfare and e¢ciency when uncertainty is present. For example, Eaton and Rosen (1980)
show that proportional income taxation may produce e¢ciency gains if the return on human
capital investment is uncertain, since redistributive taxation serves as a substitute for the
3Since our model can be solved only partially with a speci…cation in which the wage rate contains a
random term, we do not report the results here. Diamond and Mirrlees (1986) analyze the optimal structure
of social security bene…ts with exogenous productivity and disability risk.
17missing private market for income insurance. Diamond and Mirrlees (1986), on the other
hand, analyze the optimal relationship between retirement age and retirement bene…ts, when
workers with exogenous productivity face uncertainty about the length of their working lives.
Since the government is not able to verify disability, workers are compensated for disutility
of work through higher consumption compared to retirees. Diamond and Mirrlees argue
that optimal bene…ts rise with the age of retirement because this increases the incentive
to continue working for people who are able to work. However, actuarial adjustment is
incomplete because redistribution for the disabled is a desired part of insurance. Finally,
Sinn (1997) suggests that the private insurance market for career risk does not exist because
of an adverse selection problem. When agents have private knowledge, any provider of
voluntary income redistribution contracts would su¤er from adverse selection. Redistributive
taxation may therefore be used as a substitute for the missing private insurance market. An
optimal social security system should balance these bene…ts of redistribution against the
costs outlined in our study.
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19Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
To analyze incentive e¤ects of di¤erent social security systems on human capital invest-
ment and retirement, we totally di¤erentiate the system of the two …rst-order conditions
with respect to the unknown individual decision variables H and R and social security tax
rates t1, t2,a n dt3. The social security parameters B;b and x are taken as given when we
di¤erentiate with respect to individual decision variables, whereas they are treated as en-
dogenous when we di¤erentiate with respect to tax rates (for details, see Poutvaara (2000)).















































A11 =[ ( 1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ R) ¢ w
00 + Rx ¢ w
00]U
0
A12 = A21 =[ ¡(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3) ¢ w
0 + x ¢ w
0]U
0




X11 =( 1 ¡ R) ¢ w
0U
0
















20An agent works only if the net wage exceeds potential social security bene…ts. Therefore,
it must hold that:
(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3) ¢ w>b+ x ¢ w;
which implies that A12 = A21 < 0. It is easy to check that an increase in the tax rate to
…nance any component of the social security system discourages human capital investment
and encourages early retirement. Denote D = A11A22¡A12A21. This determinant is positive,









































where A11X2i > 0 and ¡A12X1i ¸ 0; 8i 2f 1;2;3g. These two equations prove proposition
1.
21We next calculate the e¤ects of changing two tax rates simultaneously such that the total











which is positive, since (1 ¡ 1



























¡(1 ¡ R) ¢ w0U0A21
D
> 0:
However, it is not possible to order constant “old age bene…ts” and “uniform retirement



















R ¡ 1) ¢ wU0A11 ¡ (1 ¡ R) ¢ w0U0A21
D
are unclear.
23Appendix B. Retirement and Human Capital Across Bene…t Schemes
Maximizing the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation of lifetime utility (5) subject to the lifetime
budget constraint (6) yields the following the …rst-order conditions:
(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2 ¡ t3)(1 ¡ R)®H®¡1 + R®H®¡1x ¡ 1
C
=0 ; (B1)






The public budget constraint for the “old age bene…ts” component is B = t1(1¡R)H®,t h a t
for “uniform retirement bene…ts” is b = t2
1¡R
R H®, and that for “income dependent bene…ts”
is x = t3
1¡R
R . When we substitute these expressions into (B1) and (B2), we obtain:
(1 ¡ t1 ¡ t2)(1 ¡ R)®H




® + ¯((1 ¡ R)H
® ¡ H)=0 : (B4)
(B3) and (B4) yield (7) and (8). We di¤erentiate (7) and (8) with respect to t1 and t3 such
that dt3 = ¡dt1. These derivations reveal that dH
dt1 jdt3=¡dt1< 0; and dR
dt1 jdt3=¡dt1< 0.
24Appendix C. Utility Comparisons
The level of utility from each di¤erent social security system can be found by substituting
the associated levels of H and R into (9). To see how the social security systems compare
to each other, we di¤erentiate the utility di¤erence between the systems with respect to t.







(¡1+® ¡ ®t)+( ¡(1 ¡ ®)(3 ¡ ®)+( ®2t ¡ 2®t))¯






¡(1 ¡ ® + ®t)(t + ¯ ¡ ¯®+ ¯®t)(1¡ ®)£
(1 ¡ t + ¯ ¡ ¯®+ ¯®t)(1+¯ ¡ ¯®+ ¯®t)
> 0: (C1)
Since (C1) is positive, “old age bene…ts” lead to higher utility than “uniform retirement
bene…ts.”
The derivative of the utility di¤erence between “income dependent bene…ts” and ”uniform
retirement bene…ts” is:
¯®t







¡(t + ¯ ¡ ¯®)(t + ¯ ¡ ¯®+ ¯®t)£
(1 ¡ ®)(1+¯ ¡ ¯®+ ¯®t)
> 0;
25which is positive.4
The derivative of the utility di¤erence between “old age bene…ts” and “income dependent
bene…ts” is:
t
(¡1+® ¡ ®t + t)
+(¡2+2 t +5 ® ¡ 3®2 ¡ 5®t +4 ®2t ¡ ®2t2 + ®t2)¯
+(3® ¡ 5®2 +5 ®2t +2 ®3 ¡ 3®3t ¡ 2®t ¡ ®2t2 + ®3t2)¯
2
¡(1 ¡ ®)(1¡ t)(1¡ ® + ®t)(1¡ t + ¯ ¡ ¯®+ ¯®t)(t + ¯ ¡ ¯®)
R 0
Evaluating this at t close to zero, we see that the denominator is positive for ® =0 :5;¯=1
and negative for ® =0 :5;¯ =1 :5. Either system may therefore dominate, depending on
values for ®;¯ and t.
4The …rst term in the nominator is negative. The second term is negative because it increases with ®;
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Figure 4.  Social security and utility (alpha=0.5; beta=1.5)